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SUMMARY 
The New Insider Trading Provisions. 
It is unfair to the investing public and detrimental to the 
interests of the security markets for a person to trade on the 
basis of inside information. In this short dissertation, the 
laws regulating insider trading in South Africa prior to the 
current legislative provisions are briefly discussed. It is 
found that the old provisions were inadequate in deterring and 
punishing insider trading activities. The current legislative 
provisions are analysed in detail. It becomes clear that whilst 
the current provisions are a substantial improvement on their 
predecessor, certain aspects need to be reconsidered. These 
include the widening of their scope to include trading in all 
kinds of derivatives; the reformulation of the statutory civil 
action and the empowerment of the securities regulation panel 
to bring a civil action against insider traders. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Insider trading or dealing are terms used to describe the 
dealing in the securities of a company by any person, on the 
basis of information, which is not generally known to the 
reasonable investor in that security, and which information, 
if it became generally known to the reasonable investor in that 
security, would be likely to materially affect the price of 
that security, and where the person deals in the security on 
the basis of such information so as to make a prof it or avoid 
a loss. 1 
Insider trading is a form of white-collar crime2 and is 
characterised by the failure of the person trading on the basis 
of inside information to disclose the inside information to the 
other party to the transaction. 3 Insider trading cases do not 
involve a positive misrepresentation by the insider. They 
.simply involve complete silence on the part of the insider. 4 
1 See Van Zyl "Die bekamping van binnekennistransaksies in Suid-Afrika" 
(1989) 1 TSAR 77 at 77. Boyle and Sykes (eds) Gore-Browne on Companies 
(1986) vol 1 state at 12.017-12.018: "Insider dealing in corporate 
securities involves the deliberate exploitation of unpublished price-
sensitive information, obtained through a privileged relationship, to make" 
a profit or avoid a loss by dealing in the securities the price of which 
would be materially altered by public disclosure of that information." 
2 Botha "Control of Insider Trading in South Africa: A Comparative 
Analysis" (1991) 3 SA Mere: LJ 1 at 2-3. See also Edelhertz "The Nature, 
Impact, and Prosecution of White Collar Crime" in Johnson and Douglas (eds) 
Crime at the Top: Deviance in Business and the Professions (1978) at 44 
where white-collar crime has been defined as " ••• illegal acts committed 
by non-physical means and by concealment or guile, to obtain money or 
property, to avoid the payment or loss of money or property, or to obtain 
business or personal advantage." 
3 The word "insider" will be used to describe the person trading on the 
basis of inside information, and the word "outsider" will be used to 
describe the other party to the transaction. 
4 Branson "American Business Law Insider Trading - I The British 
Regulation in the Light of the American Experience" 1982 J Bus L 342 at 
342-343. 
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Whilst it is not universally agreed that insider trading is 
reprehensible5 , most countries consider insider trading to be 
improper and that it should be regulated. This is normally 
based on arguments grounded in notions of fairness, market 
~fficiency and market integrity. 6 From the perspective of the 
o/ investor, insider trading is unfair mainly because it is 
considered only fair that all investors should have equal 
access to the same information. 7 It is accepted for the 
purposes of this dissertation that insider trading should be 
regulated. 8 
The current south African legislation regulating insider 
trading (the new provisions) is contained in Chapter XVA of the 
Companies Act 61 of 1973 (the Companies Act) . The new 
provisions prohibit trading on the basis of inside information9 
(insider trading) and make provision for criminal and civil 
5 Hannigan Insider Dealing (1988) at 6. 
6 See Bennetts "Regulation of Insider Trading: The Australian 
Experience" (1987) 3 Canterbury LR 254 at 255-256; Botha op cit note 2 at 
3-4; Hannigan op cit note 5 at 6-15 and Suter The Regulation of Insider 
Dealing in Britain (1989) at 14-49. A minority of writers believe that 
insider trading should not be regulated. See for example, Manne Insider 
Trading and the Stock Market (1966). 
7 Van Zyl op cit note 1 at 77. For an analysis of the effects of 
insider trading on companies, the capitalist system and management, see 
Leigh Ffrench and Rider "Should Insider Trading be Regulated? Some Initial 
Considerations" ( 1978) 95 SALJ 79 at 86-101. In Attorney-Generals Reference 
(No.1 of 1988) [1989) 1 All ER 321 at 325, Lord Lane of the Court of Appeal 
described the rationale behind the prohibition of insider trading in terms 
of the Company Securities (Insider Dealing) Act 1985 (the IDA) of the 
United Kingdom as "the obvious and understandable concern • • • about the 
damage to public confidence which insider dealing is likely to cause and 
the clear intention to prevent so far as possible what amounts to cheating 
when those with inside knowledge use that knowledge to make a profit in 
their dealing with others." 
8 Although there is very little concrete evidence in this regard, it 
can be accepted that insider trading is common in South Africa: Botha op 
cit note 2 at 1. 
9 Section 440F(l) of the Companies Act. See Luiz "Prohibition Against 
Trading on Inside Information - The Saga Continues" ( 1990) 2 SA Mere LJ 328 
at 330. 
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liability10 for trading on the basis of inside information. 
Certain rebuttable presumptions are created, where certain 
facts are proved, that will assist the state in proving the 
elements of the crime of insider trading. 11 A severe criminal 
penalty can be imposed on persons found guilty of insider 
trading . 12 
A body corporate known as the Securities Regulation Panel (the 
panel) has been created and charged with the functions, inter 
alia, of investigating and controlling insider trading. 13 To 
enable the panel to effectively perform its functions, it has 
been granted the power to subpoena and interrogate persons. 14 
Further, the panel has the power to impose an obligation on 
certain persons who, as a result of their position in a company 
or as a result of their shareholding in a company, are in a 
position to obtain inside information regarding the securities 
of that company, to disclose to the panel the extent of their 
beneficial holdings in that company and any change therein. 15 
In this way the dealing in securities by certain persons who 
are likely to obtain inside information regarding the 
securities of a company can be monitored easily. 
Provision is made for the exemption by the Minister16 of any 
class of persons from the provisions creating civil and 
criminal liability for insider trading. 17 The new provisions 
10 Section 440F ( 1) and section 440F ( 4) of the Companies Act. 
11 Section 440F(3) of the Companies Act. 
12 Section 441 ( 1) (a) of the Companies Act. 
13 Sect ion 440C ( 1) ( b) of the Companies Act. 
14 section 4400 ( 1) of the Companies Act. 
15 section 440G of the Companie.a Act. 
16 Minister of Industries, Commerce and Tour ism. 
17 Section 440F ( 6) of the Companies Act. 
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do not apply to dealings in members' interests in a close 
corporation. 18 
The objective of this short dissertation is to evaluate the law 
regulating insider dealing in South Africa in the light of the 
new provisions. Certain shortcomings in the new provisions will 
be identified and reforms to improve its effectiveness in 
deterring insider trading and compensating victims thereof, 
will be proposed. Prefatory to a detailed analysis of the new 
provisions, the remedies available to an outsider in terms of 
the common law and the statutory derivative action will be 
considered. Further, a brief overview of the predecessor to the 
new provisions will be offered. 
2. THE CO:MM:ON LAW 
2.1 General 
In South Africa, prior to 1973, there was no legislation 
regulating insider trading and thus outsiders were forced to 
seek recourse in the common law. 19 The protection afforded to 
an outsider in terms of the common law is limited. 20 
In terms of the common law the outsider, in order to succeed 
in an action against the insider, must prove that the failure 
by the insider to disclose the inside information constituted 
a form of misrepresentation. Thus the outsider must establish 
that there was a duty on the insider to disclose the inside 
information. However, in our law, there is no general duty on 
v/a person who possesses information unknown to the other party 
to disclose such information to the other party, even where he 
18 Section 440F ( 5) of the Companies Act. 
19 Botha op cit note 2 at 4. 
w See Jooste "Insider Dealing in South Africa" (1990) 107 SALJ 588 at 
600-602 and Van Zyl op cit note 1 at 85-88. 
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knows it may influence the other party in deciding whether to 
conclude the contract. 21 The duty to disclose such information 
does arise in certain exceptional circumstances. 22 Where these 
circumstances exist then the general principles regarding 
misrepresentation would be applicable. 
The duty would arise where there is a duty of good faith 
between the parties. Such a duty would, for example exist 
/ between partners or where a fiduciary relationship exists 
between parties23 • Millner suggests that the duty arises where 
there is an 
"involuntary reliance of the one party on the frank 
disclosure of certain facts necessarily lying within 
the exclusive knowledge of the other such that, in 
fair dealing, the former's right to have such 
information communicated to him would be mutually 
recognised by honest men in the circumstances. 1124 
He states: 
"It is the contemplation of reasonable men that is 
primary. Thus a party who neither looks to the other 
party for information nor expects it cannot properly 
complain of the other's silence. Stock exchange 
transactions are a clear instance of this. such 
bargains have a pronounced speculative character 
well recognised by both buyer and seller and 
heightened by the anonymity of the principals and 
the complete absence of preliminary negotiations. 
There is a common understanding in such cases that 
each is content to trust exclusively to his own 
judgment about the shares dealt in, no matter how 
unequal the knowledge of the parties may in fact be. 
But it does not automatically follow that the sale 
of the identical shares between parties negotiating 
privately, and face to face, is subject to the same 
understanding, and the origin and character of their 
21 Speight v Glass and another 1961 (1) SA 778 (D) at 781 and Hoffman 
v Moni's Wineries Ltd 1948 (2) SA 163 (C) at 168. 
~ Jooste op cit note 20 at 601. 
23 Ibid. 
J 24 Millner "Fraudulent Non-disclosure" (1957) 74 SALJ 177 at 189. 
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negotiations may very well suggest that relationship 
of involuntary dependence or trust which is or ought 
to be recognised by both parties as requiring the 
disclosure of a particular matter of which the one 
knows the other to be ignorant" . 25 
In Pretorius and another v Natal South Sea Investment Trust Ltd 
(Under Judicial Management) 26 the court approved of Millner' s 
approach in regard to face-to-face share transactions. The 
1
/ourt held that there was a duty on the directors of the 
company to disclose the existence of a particular contractual 
obligation of the company to the applicants for shares in the 
company. 27 
On the basis of Millner's formulation and the Pretorius case, 
i 
111.t appears that our common law only recognises the duty to 
~ disclose in respect of face-to-face share transactions but not 
non-face-to-face share transactions~. 
The remedies available to an outsider in a contractual action 
would be restitution and damages, and simply damages in a 
delictual action.~ 
Since brokers on the Johannesburg stock Exchange (the JSE) 
"operate a 'clearing house' for traded securities 
and deliver only differences in balance to each 
house, it is generally extremely difficult if not 
impossible to link a buyer with a particular seller 
or to link shares delivered with a particular 
sale. 1130 
25 Idem at 190. 
~ 1965 (3) SA 410 (W) at 418. 
27 Ibid. 
~ Jooste op cit note 20 at 602. 
~ Van Zyl op cit note 1 at 86. 
30 Rider "Regulation of Insider Trading in the Republic of South 
Africa" (1977) 94 SALJ 437 at 439. 
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Thus even if Millner's formulation is incorrect and our law 
recognises a duty to disclose in respect of non-face-to-face 
stock exchange share transactions, the outsider is faced with 
~ nearly impossible task of identifying the insider. 
2.2 Directors 
Our courts have not pronounced on the question whether a 
director owes a fiduciary duty to the shareholders of the 
company of which he is director31 • When they do " there appears 
to be no reason why they should deviate from the English 
view. 1132 Percival v Wright is regarded as having established 
the principle in English law that a director does not owe a 
fiduciary duty to the shareholders of his company. 33 This case 
concerned directors who acquired shares from a shareholder when 
the directors were in possession of confidential information 
about the company which would impact on the price of those 
shares. Swinfen Eady J stated: 
"I am of the opinion that the purchasing 
directors were under no obligation to disclose to 
their vendor shareholders the negotiations which 
ultimately proved abortive. The contrary view would 
place directors in a most invidious position, as 
they could not buy or sell shares without disclosing 
negotiations, a premature disclosure of which might 
well be against the best interests of the 
company. 1134 
This principle was qualified in New Zealand in the decision of 
Coleman v Meyers where it was held that in a private family-
held company the situation could be such as to establish a 
31 Jooste op cit note 20 at 601. 
32 Ibid. 
n [1902) 2 Ch 421. 
34 Idem at 426. 
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fiduciary duty between the directors and the shareholders." 
It is further possible, that for example in a takeover 
situation, the directors may place themselves in the position 
of acting as agents for the shareholders and thus, despite 
Percival v Wright, owe fiduciary duties to the shareholders. 36 
1/ If the directors then persuaded a shareholder to sell the 
shares to them at a price which they knew was materially lower 
than the price the bidder was prepared to pay and the 
shareholder was ignorant of this, then the directors would be 
breaching this duty. 37 
A director does however, owe a fiduciary duty to his company. 38 
Thus a director may not, without the informed consent of the 
company use, for his own purpose, the company's assets, 
opportµnities or information. 39 Thus it is arguable that a 
director is accountable to his company for secret profits made 
through insider trading.~ 
35 [1977) 2 NZLR 225. For a further example of a departure from the 
Percival v Wright doctrine see Strong v Repide 213 U.S. 419 (1909) at 430-
435. 
36 Gower Gower's Principles Of Modern Company Law (1992) at 608. See 
also Van Zyl op cit note 1 at 86. 
37 Gower op cit note 36 at 608. 
~ Meskin (ed) Henochsberg on the Companies Act (1985) at 388. See 
further Robinson v Randfontein Estates Gold Mining Company Limited 1921 AD 
168 at 179-180 and Novick v Comair Holdings Limited and others 1979 (2) SA 
116 (W) at 151-155. 
39 Gower op cit note 36 at 564 •. See further Atlas Organic Fertilisers 
(Pty) Ltd v Pikkewyn Ghwano (Pty) Ltd 1981 (2) SA 173 (T) at 196-199 and 
Bellairs v Hodnett 1978 (1) SA 1109 (A) at 1126-1134. 
~ See Henochsberg op cit note 38 at 391-392. In the United States, 
corporate fiduciaries who use inside information may, at common law, be 
held liable to account to the company for the gain made or loss avoided: 
Diamond v Oreamuno 24 N.Y. 2d 494, 248 N.E. 2d 910 (1969) at 912-916. The 
recovery by the company will not help the outsider unless he remains a 
shareholder of the company and unless the sum recovered is sufficient to 
cause an appreciation in the value of the shares in the company in 
question. The director however, will be deprived of his gains. 
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It is thus apparent that in terms of the common law an outsider 
has a cause of action against an insider in certain limited 
circumstances. In addition, the outsider can receive indirect 
compensation where the company recovers the insider gains of 
a director. However, the likelihood of such an action being 
instituted is remote since it is unlikely that a company would 
v' institute action against a director. Whilst the outsider can 
institute the company's action in a common law derivative 
action, it is unlikely that the outsider would do so since, 
should he succeed, the benefits he would receive would 
generally be small whereas should he fail, the legal costs 
would be large. 41 
It would seem that as at the enactment of section 233 of the 
Companies Act, the common law had not developed to the extent 
where it constituted a meaningful deterrent to insider trading 
or an adequate remedy providing compensation for the victims 
of insider trading. 
3. THE STATUfORY DERIVATIVE ACTION 
The question arises whether the statutory derivative action in 
terms of section 266 of the companies Act provides outsiders42 
with a remedy against directors or officers of a company who 
trade in the securities of that company on the basis of inside 
information. For section 266 to be applicable, the use of 
inside information by a director or off icer43 of a company must 
constitute a wrong, breach of faith or breach of trust by the 
director or officer concerned. 44 In addition the company must 
41 See Van Zyl op cit note 1 at 88. 
42 The outsider must be a member of the company before section 266 
becomes available to the outsider: Section 266(1) of the Companies Act. 
43 As defined in section 1 of the Companies Act. 
~ Section 266(1) of the Companies Act. 
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as a result thereof have suffered damages or loss or been 
deprived of a benefit. 45 Under what circumstances would a 
company suffer damages or loss or be deprived of a benefit 
where a director or officer of the company deals in the 
securities of the company on the basis of inside information? 
Where the insider dealing by the director or officer affects 
the price of the securities of the company with the result that 
the company's ability to raise capital in the market is 
prejudiced or the company's position in a take-over bid is 
prejudiced, it is arguable that the company suffered damages 
or loss or was deprived of a benefit.% However, since the 
price of a company's securities is influenced by many factors, 
it seems unlikely that an outsider would be able to establish 
that it was the dealing by the director or officer that caused 
the movement in the price of the company's securities and thus 
/the damage 
V company. 47 
266 of the 
or loss or deprivation of a benefit suffered by the 
It is thus felt that it is unlikely that section 
Companies Act provides any assistance to outsiders. 
4. THE OLD STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Section 23348 of the Companies Act read with sections 22449 , 
45 Ibid. 
~ Van Zyl op cit note 1 at 84. · 
47 Ibid. 
~ See the Main Report of the Commission of Enquiry into the Companies 
Act (the Van Wyk de Vries Report) RP 45(1970). The recommendations of the 
Commission regarding insider trading resulted in the enactment of section 
229 and section 233. 
49 Section 224, inter alia, prohibited directors from dealing in 
options in respect of listed shares and debentures of the company or its 
subsidiary or holding company or a subsidiary of its holding company. 
11 
22950 , 23051 , 23152 , 23253 , and 44154 was the first attempt to 
control insider trading in South Africa~" 
Section 233 provided that: 
"Every director, past director, officer or person 
who has knowledge of any information concerning a 
transaction or proposed transaction of the company 
or of the affairs of the company which, if it 
becomes publicly known, may be expected materially 
to affect the price of the shares or debentures of 
the company and who deals in any way to his 
advantage, directly or indirectly, in such shares or 
debentures while such information has not been 
publicly announced on a stock exchange or in a 
newspaper or through the medium of the radio or 
television, shall be guilty of an offence." 
The JSE, the Registrar of Companies and the Department of 
Justice were responsible for the enforcement of the criminal 
sanctions for insider trading contained in section 233. The 
~ Section 229 defined interest, officer, past director, person, shares 
and debentures of the company for the purposes of sections 230, 231, 232 
and 233 of the Companies Act. 
51 Section 230, inter alia, obliged every public company having a share 
capital to keep a register of interests of directors and others in shares 
and debentures of the company. 
52 Section 231, inter alia, required the directors of a company when 
they have knowledge of inside information relating to the company to 
determine by resolution of the company which officers of the company, whose 
names had not already been entered in the register under section 230, are 
to be taken as possessed of the inside information during the course of 
their respective duties and to cause their names to be entered into the 
register. 
53 Section 232, inter alia, obliged directors, past directors, officers 
and certain persons to lodge with ·a company within a specified period 
written notice regarding changes in any material interest in their 
shareholding in the company concerned. 
54 Section 441(1) (·b) provided that the criminal penalties for 
contravening Section 233 was a maximum fine of RB 000, 00 or two years 
imprisonment, or both such fine and imprisonment. 
55 Section 224 and sections 229 - 233 were repealed by section 6 of the 
Companies Amendment Act 78 of 1989 with effect from 1 February 1991 in 
terms of Government Notice RlO Government Gazette 12997 of 1 February 1991 
(Reg. Gaz. 4646). 
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JSE' s function was the detection of insider trading by the 
monitoring of trading. It had the power to request the dealing 
returns from brokers when insider trading was suspected. The 
JSE would submit the returns to the Registrar of Companies who 
was responsible for the further investigation of the matter. 
Finally the evidence would be handed to the Attorney General 
who would decide whether or not to prosecute the matter. 56 
~ection 233 was completely ineffective and did not result in 
G/ any prosecutions. 57 It failed to make provision for the lapse 
of a reasonable period after the public announcement of 
information. Thus insiders could deal immediately after the 
publication of price-sensitive information and before the share 
prices reflected the information. In this way, insiders could 
circumvent section 233. 58 The price-sensitive information 
covered by section 233 had to relate to "a transaction or 
proposed transaction of the company or of the affairs of the 
company". It thus did not cover information about the market 
for a company's securities. 59 Only a limited category of 
persons were insiders for the purposes of section 233. 6° For 
example, it did not include within its ambit the activities of 
secondary insider traders, eg. tippees.M 
Rider stated in regard to section 233 that: "It is not perhaps 
uncharitable to describe the South African statutory provisions 
as an unholy jumble or even a statutory mess. 1162 
~ Botha op cit note 2 at 5. 
57 Ibid. For a critique of section 233 see Rider op cit note 30 at 442-
448 and Van Zyl op cit note 1 at 77~84. 
58 Jooste op cit note 20 at 593-594. 
59 Idem at 594. 
00 van Zyl op cit note 1 at 77-79. 
61 Jooste op cit note 20 at 595. 
~ Rider op cit note 30 at 445. The criminalisation of insider trading 
in terms of section 233 meant that insider trading was wrongful at civil 
law. Thus section 233 enabled the outsider to bring a delictual action 
13 
5. THE NEW PROVISIONS 
5.1 Source of the New Provisions 
The new provisions regulating insider trading were contained 
in the Companies Amendment Act 78 of 1989 and the Companies 
Second Amendment Act 69 of 1990. 63 
Section 440F of the 1989 Amendment Act never came into 
operation and was replaced by a new section 440F in terms of 
section 3 of the 1990 Amendment Act. Section 440FM of the 1989 
against the insider for damages suffered as a result of the insider's 
insider trading: Jooste.op cit note 20 at 602. However, it would still have 
been necessary to establish privity which would only have been possible in 
face-to-face share transactions. 
~ Section 4(a) of the 1989 Amendment Act inserted Chapter XVA titled 
"Regulation of Securities" into the Companies Act. Section 4(b) of the 1989 
Amendment Act inserted, inter alia, the new provisions being sections 440A, 
4408, 440C, 4400, 440E, 440F and 440G into the Companies Act. The new 
provisions form part of Chapter XVA. Section 4408 was put into operation 
with effect from 1 October 1989 in terms of Government Notice Rl 70 in 
Government Gazette 12112 of 29 September 1989 (Reg. Gaz. 4414). Sections 
440A, 440C, 4400 and 440E were put into operation with effect from 26 
January 1990 in terms of Government Notice Rll in Government Gazette 12265 
of 26 January 1990 (Reg. Gaz. 4448). Section 440C was amended by the 1990 
Amendment Act. 
~ Section 440F of the 1989 Amendment Act provided that: 
"(1) Any person who, directly or indirectly, in connection with the 
purchase or sale of any security -
(a) employs any device, scheme or artifice to defraud any person; 
(b) makes any untrue statement of a material fact or omits to state 
a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, 
in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, 
not misleading; or 
(c) engages in any act, practice or course of business which 
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, 
shall be guilty of an offence. 
(2) Any action specified in paragraph (a), (b) or (c) of subsection (1) 
includes -
(a) any director, past director or officer of a company or any 
person connected with a company having knowledge of any 
information likely, when published, to affect the price of 
14 
Amendment Act was based on American legislation, namely rule 
lOb-5 promulgated by the Securities Exchange Commission and 
section 10 (b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the 
Securities Exchange Act). It was subject to substantial 
criticism. Botha wrote that sections 440F{l) and (2) of the 
1989 Amendment Act "again failed to provide an operational 
~finition of an insider trader and insider information. "65 
Luiz commented: 
"Although the interpretations of the American courts 
may well have produced considerable certainty in 
American law, our courts are obliged to interpret 
any legislation enacted by the South African 
legislature in accordance with established South 
African legal principles, and it is thus doubtful 
whether the same certainty would prevail here. For 
example, the memorandum itself recognised that the 
concept 'fraud' in the United States differs from 
ours. It is axiomatic that problems of interpreta-
tion lurk in the background when foreign legislation 
is adopted piecemeal into any municipal system of 
law. 1166 
securities of that company, dealing, except for the proper 
performance of the functions attaching to his position with 
that company, in such securities before the expiration pf a 
period of not less than 24 hours after such information has 
been publicly announced for the first time on a stock exchange 
or in a newspaper or through the medium of the radio or 
television or by any other means; 
(b) any other person, having directly or indirectly received from 
any person mentioned in paragraph (a) such information, so 
dealing, on the basis of such information, in such securities 
at a time when the said person mentioned in paragraph (a) may 
in terms of that subsection not so deal in such securities. 
(3) Any person who contravenes subsection (1), or subsection (2) as applied 
by subsection (1), shall, subject to any defence that may be available to 
him, be liable to any person for any loss or damage suffered by him as a 
result of such contravention. 
(4) The provisions of this section shall not apply to dealings in members' 
interests in close corporations." 
~ Botha op cit note 2 at 9. 
~ Luiz op cit note 9 at 328-329. 
15 
Section 3 of the 1990 Amendment Act was an attempt to remedy 
the defects of the 1989 Amendment Act. 67 A statement from the 
Memorandum on the Objects of the Companies Second Amendment 
Bill 1990 said: 
"The present provisions of section 440F of the Act, 
which place a prohibition on insider trading, were 
derived from the equivalent provisions in the United 
states of America, mainly because interpretations by 
courts over the past few years have given a high 
degree of certainty to the legislation. Although 
section 440F has not yet been put into operation, 
the perception, and indeed the fear, have arisen on 
the part of some South African financial institu-
tions that the net has been cast too wide and that 
certain important, innocent investment activities 
are included in the prohibition. This perception is 
largely based on the fear that South African common 
law concepts of fraud differ from those in the 
United States of America, and that those differences 
will result in South African courts giving an 
interpretation which will widen the prohibition. The 
proposed amendments are aimed at clarifying the 
scope of the prohibition. 1168 
s.2 The Panel 
s.2.1 The Establishment of the Panel 
Section 440B of the Companies Act established a body corporate 
to be known as the Securities Regulation Panel69 and provides 
that its members shall be appointed by the Minister70 of 
Industries, Commerce and Tourism. 
67 Section 440F came into operation on 1 February 1991 in terms of 
Government Notice Rll Government Gazette 12997 of 1 February 1991 (Reg. 
Gaz. 4646). 
~ (8 119 - 90 (GA)] at 17. 
M. Section 4408(1) of the Companies Act. 
~ Section 4408(2) of the Companies Act. 
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The members of the panel consist of the chairman71 , the 
Registrar, the chairman of the Competition Board72 , such 
persons nominated by the organisations specified in section 
4 4 OB ( 3) 73 , and any other persons co-opted by the panel as 
additional members in terms of section 44 OB ( 6) . 74 Every member 
holds office for a period of five years75 provided that the 
71 The chairman need not be one of the nominated members and is 
designated -by those members who were nominated by the organisations 
referred to in section 440B(3): section 440B(4) of the Companies Act. The 
panel may designate a member of the panel to act as acting chairman, to 
exercise and perform the powers and duties of the chairman whenever the 
chairman is unable to do so or while the office of the chairman is vacant: 
section 440B(S) of the companies Act. The chairman decides the time and 
place of the meetings of the panel: section 440B(lO)(a) of the Companies 
Act. The procedures at such meetings are determined by the person presiding 
at such meeting: section 440B(lO)(b) of the Companies Act. The decision of 
the majority of the members of the panel present at any meeting at which 
there is a quorum constitute the decision of the panel: section 440B(lO)(c) 
of the Companies Act. Where there is an equality of votes the chairman has 
a casting vote in addition to his deliberative vote: section 440(10)(c) of 
the Companies Act. No proceedings of the panel are invalid by reason only 
of the fact that a vacancy existed on the panel and that any member was not 
present during the proceedings or any part thereof: section 440B(lO)(d) of 
the Companies Act. The panel shall appoint an executive director to hold 
office for a period and on the conditions ~etermined by the panel: section 
440B ( 11) of the Companies Act. In addition, the panel shall have an 
executive committee which consists of the executive director and so many 
members of the panel as the panel may determine, one of whom may be the 
chairman of the panel: section 440B(l2) of the Companies Act. 
72 The Competition Board was established by section 3 of the 
Maintenance and Promotion of Competition Act 96 of 1979. 
n The bodies are: the Johannesburg Stock Exchange, the South African 
Federated Chamber of Industries, the Association of Chambers of Commerce 
and Industry of South Africa, the Afrikaanse Handelsinstituut, the 
Association of General Banks, the Clearing Bankers Association of South 
Africa, the Merchant Bankers' Association, the Shareholders' Association 
of South Africa, the Pensions Institute (of Southern Africa), the Chamber 
of Mines of South Africa, the Life Offices' Association of South Africa, 
the South African Institute of Chartered Accountants, and the Association 
of Law Societies of the Republic of South Africa. 
~ Section 440B(3) provides that the organisations listed in section 
440B(3) shall be entitled to nominate one person, and in the case of the 
JSE three persons, to serve on the panel. 
15 If, during any such five year period, a member of the panel 
nominated pursuant to the provisions of section 440B ( 3) dies, becomes 
incapacitated, resigns, or becomes disqualified from being appointed or 
acting as a director of a company in terms of section 218 of the Companies 
Act, or ceases for any other reason to be a member of the panel, the 
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said organisations may apply to the Minister to have their 
nominated members replaced by any other nominee before the 
expiry of the member's term of office. 76 
The panel can appoint such officers and employees as are 
necessary for the proper functioning of the panel. 77 The panel 
can delegate any of its powers to the executive committee or 
to any sub-committee of the panel which may have been 
established by the panel. 78 
s.2.2 The Functions of the Panel 
s.2.2.1 Investigation by the Panel 
The Memorandum on the Objects of the Companies Amendment Bill 
1989 stated in respect of the panel: 
"A further function of the panel will be to exercise 
control over insider trading. 79 This Bill aims at 
eliminating the deficiencies which exist in this 
regard in respect of the present provisions in the 
Companies Act, 1973. The panel will have power to 
investigate cases of suspected insider trading. In 
this regard the panel will be a proper forum where 
vacancy so arising may be filled for the unexpired portion of such member's 
term of office by a nominee of the organisation who nominated such member: 
section 440B(8) of the Companies Act. Members on expiry of their term of 
office are eligible for reappointment: section 440B(9) of the Companies 
Act. 
76 Section 440B ( 7) of the Companies Act. 
n Section 440B(l3) of the Companies Act. 
~ Section 440B(l4) of the Companies Act. 
n Section 440C(l)(b) provides that one of the functions of the panel 
is to supervise the dealings in securities that are contemplated in terms 
of Chapter XVA. Section 440C(6)(c) provides that the panel or its executive 
committee or its executive director may receive and deal with 
representations relating to any matter with which it may deal in terms of 
Chapter XVA. Section 440C(6)(d) provides that the panel or its executive 
committee or its executive director may perform any other functions 
assigned to it in Chapter XVA. 
complaints 
lodged. 1180 
regarding 
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insider trading can be 
The role played by the panel is fundamental to the success of 
the new provisions. Insider trading activities must be detected 
and properly investigated so as to facilitate the successful 
prosecution of offenders. It is improbable that, without the 
existence of the panel with its powers of interrogation and 
subpoena81 and its powers in terms of section 440G, the new 
~ [B99-89 (GA)] at 20. 
81 section 4400 ( 1) empowers the panel or any committee thereof for the 
purpose of fulfilling its functions in terms of Chapter XVA to -
(a) summon any person who is believed to be able to furnish any 
information on the subject of an investigation or to have in 
his possession or under his control any book, document or other 
object which has any bearing on that subject, to appear before 
the panel or the committee at the time and place specified in 
the summons, to be interrogated or to produce such book, 
document or other object; and 
(b) to interrogate any such person under oath or affirmation 
administered by the chairman or a person appointed by him, and 
to examine or retain for examination such book, document or 
other object. 
Section 4400(2) provides that such summons shall be in the form prescribed 
by the panel and shall be signed by the chairman of the panel or committee 
and that it shall be served in the manner so prescribed. 
Section 4400(3) provides that any person who has been summoned to attend 
before, or to produce any book, document or other object to the panel or 
a committee thereof, and who, without sufficient cause (the onus of proof 
of which shall rest on him), fails to attend at the time and place 
specified in the summons or who fails to remain in attendance until excused 
by the chairman thereof, or, having attended, refuses to be sworn or make 
an affirmation after he has been ·asked by the chairman (or a person 
appointed by him) to do so, or who, having been sworn or having made 
affirmation, fails to fully and satisfactorily answer any question lawfully 
put to him, or who fails to produce any book, document or other object in 
his possession or under his control which he has been summoned to produce, 
shall be guilty of an offence. 
Section 4400(4) provides that any person who, after having been sworn or 
having made affirmation, gives false evidence before the panel or a 
committee thereof knowing such evidence to be false or who does not believe 
the evidence is true, shall be guilty of an offence. 
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provisions will be any more effective in d'eterring insider 
trading than the old provisions. 82 
s.2.2.2 Disclosure to the Panel 
Section 440G(1) 83 provides the panel with authority to require 
"by notice in the Gazette that every person who is 
or becomes directly or indirectly the beneficial 
owner84 of more than 10 per cent, or such other 
percentage as may be prescribed by the panel by 
notice in the Gazette, of any class of any equity 
security (other than a security exempted in terms of 
the rules) which is dealt with on a stock exchange, 
or who is a director or an officer of the issuer of 
such security, lodge, at the time of the listing of 
such security on a stock exchange, or within 10 days 
after he or it becomes such beneficial owner, 
director or officer, a statement with the panel of 
the amount of all equity securities of such issuer 
of which he or it is the beneficial owner, and 
within 10 days after the close of each calendar 
Section 4400(5) provides that the law relating to privilege as applicable 
to a witness giving evidence before, or summoned to produce a book, 
document or other object to, a provincial.division of the Supreme Court of 
South Africa shall apply in relation to any person summoned under section 
4400. 
Section 4400 ( 6) provides that nothing contained in Chapter XVA of the 
Companies Act shall be deemed to compel the production by a legal advisor 
of a letter, report or other document containing a privileged communication 
made by or to him as legal adviser, or to authorise the seizure or 
retention thereof. 
~ See Jooste op cit note 20 at 589. 
~ Section 440G was introduced by the 1989 Companies Amendment Act and 
was amended by the 1990 Companies Second Amendment Act. Section 440G was 
put into operation with effect from 1 February 1991 in terms of Government 
Notice RlO in Government Gazette 12997 of 1February1991 (Reg. Gaz. 4646). 
Section 440G(l) is almost identical to section 16(a) of the Securities 
Exchange Act. 
~ A person would directly be the beneficial owner where the equity 
security is registered in his name or the name of a nominee. It is 
suggested that a person would be regarded as indirectly the beneficial 
owner where, inter alia, the securities are held in the name of another 
person if by some agreement or arrangement he acquires benefits which are 
similar to those of ownership; or all the securities are held by a company 
which he controls: see Loss Fundamentals of Securities Regulation (1988) 
at 569-574. 
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month thereafter, if there has been any change85 , in 
such manner as may be determined by the panel by 
notice in the Gazette, in such ownership during such 
month, file with the panel a statement indicating 
such change in his or its ownership as has occurred 
during the calendar month." 
Section 440G(2} provides that any person who fails to comply 
with any provision of section 440G(l} shall be guilty of an 
offence. The penalty is a fine not exceeding R20 000,00 or 
imprisonment not exceeding five years or both. 86 
The purpose of section 440G is to assist in the determination 
of the identity of insiders in respect of stock exchange share 
transactions87 • It is focused on those persons who are more 
likely than any other to acquire unpublished price-sensitive 
information in respect of a security and thus be in a position 
to trade on the basis thereof, namely those persons who are in 
a position of power within a company and those persons who have 
power over a company as a result of their shareholding in the 
company. 88 By requiring such persons to file a statement with 
the panel of all equity securities of which they are the 
beneficial owner and within ten days after the close of each 
calendar month a statement of any change therein, the panel 
will be able to relate the time period during which such person 
traded to the time which such person had unpublished price-
sensi ti ve information in his possession89 • In this way, section 
85 Any change in beneficial ownership must be reported whether it 
results from a purchase or a sale or any other event. 
86 Section 441 ( 1) ( c) of the Companies Act. 
87 The regulation of insider trading will only be effective when 
insiders believe that there is a reasonable chance of detection. Where the 
transaction is face-to-face involving unquoted securities then the outsider 
will easily be able to detect the insider with whom he dealt. The problem 
of detection exists mainly in stock exchange transactions because the 
anonymity of the system will generally allow the insider to avoid 
detection. This is because existing stock exchange and broking procedures 
do not facilitate the identification of the parties to the transaction. 
~ Jooste op cit note 20 at 599. 
89 Ibid. 
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440G facilitates the easy detection of insider trading by such 
persons. 
It is fundamental to the success of the new provisions that the 
reporting requirements of section 440G are strictly enforced. 90 
If it is realised that the failure to comply with the provi-
sions of section 440G is not likely to be detected, there will 
be a great incentive for persons not to disclose. Further, if 
the criminal provisions of section 440G ( 2) are not readily 
enforced, then the system of deterrence through disclosure 
created in section 440G(l) will fail.~ 
Section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act enables a company 
to recover profits made by persons referred to in section 16 (a) 
of that Act from the sale and purchase, or purchase and then 
sale, of equity in their company within a period of six 
months. 92 It thus provides for the recovery of short swing 
prof its from those persons required to file insider reports 
under section 16 (a). 93 The purpose of the section is to 
prevent the unfair use of information by such persons which 
information they may have obtained by reason of their 
relationship to the issuer.~ Since the equivalent of section 
16(a) was enacted in section 440G, the question arises why the 
equivalent of section 16 (b) was not enacted and whether it 
should ha,ve been. 95 
~ See Bennetts op cit note 6 at 276. 
91 Ibid. 
~ Loss op cit note 84 at 542-543. 
93 See Davies "Canadian and American Attitudes on Insider Trading" 
(1975) 25 University of Toronto LJ 215 at 224. 
~ Lo~s op cit note 84 at 542. 
95 For a discussion on section 16(b), see Luiz "Insider Trading: A 
Transplant to Cure a Chronic Illness" ( 1990) 2 SA Mere LJ 59 at 66 and 
Davies op cit note 93 at 224-229. 
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Section 16(b) has been criticised for punishing the persons 
referred to in section 16(a) for simply dealing in securities 
and not because they were dealing in the securities on the 
basis of inside information. 96 The effect of section 16 (b) is 
that liability arises irrespective of the person's knowledge 
or intention.~ The liability arises automatically because the 
person happened to trade in the company's securities during the 
six-month period. A further criticism is that it may discourage 
insiders from investing in securities in their own company 
because they are unable to realise the security during the six 
month period without incurring liability." 
On the other hand, section 16(b) has been remarkably effective 
in achieving its objectives. 99 This is to some extent 
J attributable to the simplicity of the section. The elements of 
the action are simple, and thus the defendant in most cases 
will find that he has no alternative but to pay up100 • It is 
thus recommended that the new provisions be supplemented by the 
enactment of an equivalent to section 16(b). 
5.3 Prohibition of Insider Trading 
Section 440F(l) of the Companies Act provides: 
% Davies op cit note 93 at 224. 
97 Ibid. 
~ It appears that this would be the case irrespective of the reason 
the insider decided to realise his investment. Thus the section would be 
applicable even if the security was obtained pursuant to a share incentive 
scheme. In this regard it should be noted that it is generally accepted 
that it is beneficial for a company to have directors and officers purchase 
securities in the company as they thereby acquire a direct financial 
interest in the company: Davies op cit note 93 at 224. 
w Loss op cit note 84 at 550. 
100 Ibid. See also Wallace "Who is subject to the prohibition against 
insider trading: a comparative study of American, British and French law" 
(1984-1985) 15 Southwestern University LR 217 at 221. 
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"Any person who, whether directly or indirectly, 
knowingly deals in a security on the basis of 
unpublished price-sensitive information in respect 
of that security, shall be guilty of an offence if 
such person knows that such information has been 
obtained -
(a) 
(b) 
5.3.1 
by virtue of a relationship of trust or 
any other contractual relationship, 
whether or not the person concerned is a 
party to that relationship; or 
through espionage, theft, bribery, fraud, 
misrepresentation or any other wrongful 
method, irrespective of the nature 
thereof." 
Knowledge that the information was obtained as 
provided for in paragraphs (a) and (b) of section 
440F(l) 
The new provisions do not prohibit dealing in securities on the 
basis of unpublished price-sensitive information in circum-
stances where the person dealing is simply in possession of the ~npublished price-sensitive information. 101 The new provisions 
101 The "possession theory": see SEC v Texas Gulf Sulphur Co 401 F 2d 
833 at 848 (2d Cir 1968) where the court stated: "Anyone in possession of 
material insider information must either disclose it to the investing 
public, or, if ••• he chooses not to do so, must abstain from trading in 
or recommending the securities while such information remains undisclosed." 
See Van Zyl "Aspekte van Beleggersbeskerming in die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg" 
PhD Thesis, UNISA, March 1991 at 254. See also United States v Chiarella 
588 F. 2d 1358 (2d Cir 1978). In this case, a printer's employee 
(Chiarella) decoded offer documents and bought stock of the target company. 
When the offer was made public, the stock rose. Chiarella argued that he 
was not an "insider" and accordingly could trade freely. The Court of 
Appeals at 1365 rejected his argument and applied the possessi~n theory: 
"Anyone., corporate insider or not, who regularly receives material 
nonpublic information may not use that information without incurring an 
affirmative duty to disclose. And if he cannot disclose he must abstain 
from buying or selling." This formulation was rejected by the Supreme Court 
(Chiarella v United States 445 U.S. 222 at 233) where the majority opinion 
denied that there was "a general duty between all participants in market 
transactions to forgo actions based on material, nonpublic information." 
The Supreme Court held at 230 that "such liability is premised upon a duty 
to disclose arising from a relationship of trust and confidence between 
parties to a transaction." See also Wallace op cit note 100 at 252. 
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prohibit dealing in securities on the basis of unpublished 
price-sensitive information where the person "knows" the 
information was "obtained" by the means set out in paragraphs 
(a) or (b) of section 440F(l). 
Paragraph (a) of section 440F(l) includes within its ambit 
persons who obtain the unpublished price-sensitive information 
by virtue of being a party to a relationship of trust, or 
contractual relationship. It further includes persons who are 
not a party to the said relationships but, who nevertheless 
obtain the unpublished price-sensitive information and who know 
the information was obtained by virtue of the said 
relationships. 
The relationship of trust or the contractual relationship is 
not limited to relationships of a specific nature such as that 
between a director and a company, or between an employee and 
a company, or between the parties to a share transaction. 102 
The company in respect of whose securities a person dealt on 
the basis of the unpublished price-sensitive information need 
not be a party to the relationship of trust or the contractual 
relationship. 103 
J The expression "a relationship of trust" clearly includes a 
fiduciary relationship. It is suggested that a relationship of 
trust exists whenever there is a duty between parties to act 
in good faith towards one another and where there is an 
t 
It should be noted that whilst section 440F(l) has not incorporated the 
possession theory, section 440F(3)(a) read with section 440F(3)(i) creates 
a presumption which provides that where it is proved at criminal 
proceedings that the accused was in possession of unpublished price-
sensitive information in respect of the security in question at the time 
of the alleged dealing, that the accused shall be deemed, unless the 
contrary is pr~ved, to have knowingly dealt in that security on the basis 
of such information. 
100 Van Zyl op cit note 101 at 256. 
103 The person who deals on the basis of the unpublished price-sensitive 
information need not be connected in any way with the company concerned. 
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expectation of confidentiality between parties. 1~ Further, the 
relationship of trust need not arise from a professional or 
business relationship. A relationship of trust could possibly 
be held to include relationships of trust such as the 
relationship between psychiatrist and patient105 and between 
family members . 106 
The expression "any other contractual relationship" refers to 
a relationship arising from a contract. The expression is not 
qualified in any way and accordingly, should be interpreted on 
the basis that the legislature intended by the use of the words 
"contractual relationship11107 to convey a meaning which is 
generally understood. 108 
It will depend on the facts of each case whether it can be said 
that the unpublished price-sensitive information was obtained 
"by virtue of" a relationship of trust or contractual 
relationship. 
Paragraph (b) of section 440F ( 1) refers to information obtained 
"through espionage, theft, bribery, fraud, misrepresentation 
1~ Jooste op cit note 20 at 596. 
105 See United States v Willis 737 F. Supp. 269 at 271-275 
(S.D.N.Y.1990) where the District Court held that the United States could 
prosecute a psychiatrist, in terms of rule lOb-5 of the Securities Exchange 
Commission, who breached his doctor/patient duty of confidentiality by 
trading on information he received in the course of treating a patient. 
1~ In United States v Reed 601 F. Supp. 685 at 717-718 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) 
the court held that the breach of a relationship of trust and confidence 
between family members was a sufficient basis for alleging fraud in terms 
of rule lOb-5 of the Securities Exchange Commission. 
107 Hutchison (ed) Wilie's Principles of South African Law (1991) at 409 
states: "A contract is an agreement between two or more persons which gives 
rise to personal rights and corresponding obligations; in other words, it 
is an agreement which is legally binding on the parties." See Pattinson and 
another v Fell and another 1963 (3) SA 277 (N) at 279. 
108 See Estate Breet v Peri-Urban Areas Health Board 1955 ( 3) SA 523 (A) 
at 532 where the court was interpreting the word "contract" in the context 
of sections 3(2)(c)(i) and 3(2)(d) of the Prescription Act 18 of 1943. 
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or any other wrongful method, irrespective of the nature 
thereof." 
The words "irrespective of the nature thereof" indicate that 
the nature of the espionage, theft, bribery, fraud, misrepre-
sentation or other wrongful method is irrelevant. This 
indicates that an innocent misrepresentation is included within 
the ambit of section 440F(l) (b). 1~ It is submitted that the 
words further indicate that a broad interpretation is to be 
given to the word "wrongful" that includes methods that are not 
only illegal or constitute a breach of a legal duty, but are 
also unfair or constitute a violation of equity. 
When can it be said that a person "knows 11110 that the 
unpublished price-sensitive information was obtained by the 
means set out in paragraphs (a) or (b) of section 440F(l)? The 
meaning of the word "knows" must be determined from its 
context.Ill It is submitted that something more than m:ere 
suspicion or belief would be necessary . 112 It is further 
submitted that mere knowledge of sources from which the person 
could ascertain whether the unpublished price-sensitive 
information was so obtained would not suffice. 113 It is 
suggested that a person "knows", for the purposes of section 
440F(l), where the person has actual knowledge or where the 
person has knowledge of circumstances which ordinarily lead to 
the conclusion that the information was obtained by the means 
iw See Luiz op cit note 9 at 329. 
110 The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary on Historical Principles 
(1988) defines "know" as, inter alia, "to be aware of, to apprehend or 
comprehend as a fact or truth". 
111 See Botha v Muir 1952 (2) SA 358 (E) at 364 where the court was 
dealing with the meaning of the word "knowledge" in the context of Rule 
46(9) of the Magistrates Court Act 32 of 1944. 
112 See Patterton v Minister van Bantoeadministrasie en Ontwikkeling 
1974 (3) SA 684 (C) at 687 where the meaning of the word "knowledge" was 
discussed in the context of section 29 of the Public Service Act 54 of 
1957. 
113 Botha v Muir op cit note 111 at 365. 
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set out in paragraphs (a) or (b) of section 440F ( 1) . 114 A 
presumption is created in terms of section 440F(3) (b) read with 
section 440F(3) (ii) which provides that where it is proved at 
criminal proceedings in terms of which the accused is charged 
with contravening section 440F ( 1) , that unpublished price-
sensitive information was obtained in the manner contemplated 
in section 440F(l) (a) or section 440F(l) (b) that the accused 
shall be deemed unless the contrary is proved to have known 
that the information was so obtained. 
When can it be said that the unpublished price-sensitive 
information was "obtained" by the means set out in paragraphs 
(a) or (b) of section 440F(l)? In Attorney-Generals Reference 
the Court of Appeal of England held that the word "obtain" for 
the purposes of the Company Securities (Insider Dealing) Act 
1985 (the IDA) includes the receipt of information where no 
positive steps are taken by the insider to acquire the 
information. 115 The Court of Appeal held that: 
"Now, so far as gaining an unfair advantage of or, 
put bluntly, cheating the other party to a 
transaction is concerned, it makes no difference to 
the person cheated whether the information on which 
the 'tippee' is basing the cheating was sought out 
by him or came his way by unsolicited gift. 11116 
114 Strouds Judicial Dictionary of Words and Phrases ( 1986) at 1394 
says: "To know a thing or state of things, is not only to have precise 
knowledge of it; knowledge of circumstances ordinarily leading to the 
conclusion that the thing or state of things exists will suffice ••• " See 
Howard v Herrigel and another NNO 1991 (2) SA 660 (A) at 673-674 where the 
court discussed the meaning of "knowingly" as contained in section 424 of 
the Companies Act and held that it meant that" ••• the person sought to be 
· held liable had knowledge of the facts from which the conclusion is 
properly to be drawn that the business of the company was or is being 
carried on recklessly ••• " 
115 Attorney-Generals Reference op cit note 7 at 325. 
116 Ibid. This interpretation was affirmed by the House of Lords in 
Attorney-Generals Reference (No 1 of 1988) [1989) 2 All ER 1. 
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It is suggested that the same interpretation should be given 
to the word "obtained" in section 440F. 117 
5.3.2 
5.3.2.1 
Any person who directly or indirectly, knowingly 
deals in a security on the basis of unpublished 
price-sensitive information 
Deals 
To deal118 in a security involves the changing of one's 
position in regard to the security. 1~ A person will deal in 
securities if the person buys or sells securities, trades in 
securities or barters in securities. 120 A single transaction 
involving a security would constitute dealing in that security 
since to hold otherwise would mean that section 440F(l) does 
not include within its scope all isolated instances of insider 
trading. 121 
Since to deal in a security involves the changing of one's 
position in regard to the security, the mere possession of 
inside information does not constitute insider trading. Thus 
the decision not to deal on the basis of inside information 
would not constitute a contravention of section 440F(l) even 
where the person would have dealt if he were not in the 
possession of the inside information. 122 Even if it did 
constitute a contravention of section 44 OF ( 1) , it would be 
extremely difficult to prove. 
117 Van Zyl op cit note 101 at 255. 
118 The word "deals" is not defined in the Companies Act. 
119 Jooste op cit note 20 at 593. 
1~ See Robins-Browne v Cohen and others 1939 WLD 262 at 265-6 where to 
deal in a commodity was held to mean to buy or sell. See also R v 
Oberholzer and others 1941 OPD 48 at 59-60 and Corona v Minister of Home 
Affairs 1982 (2) SA 533 (ZH) at 539-540. 
121 Van Dorsten South African Business Entities, A Practical Guide 
(1993) at 182. 
ln See Gore-Browne op cit note 1 at 12.0268. 
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Further, the requirement that the person must deal in the 
security does not imply that the person must acquire a benefit 
therefrom. This should be contrasted to section 233 where no 
offence was committed unless the offender "dealt in any way to 
his advantage. 11123 
It is also apparent that the communication of inside 
information to another person or the counselling or procuring 
of another individual to deal in a security on the basis of 
inside information does not constitute dealing in a security, 
and is thus not prohibited by the new provisions. 124 This 
should be contrasted with the position in Great Britain where, 
in terms of the IDA, it is an offence for an individual to 
counsel or procure125 a person to deal in securities on the 
basis of inside information, or to communicate inside 
information to other persons. 126 
5.3.2.2 Directly or indirectly 
The words "directly or indirectly" qualify the meaning of the 
word "deals". Direct dealing would take place where the person 
in Jooste op cit note 20 at 593. 
124 Should the person to whom the inside information has been 
communicated or who has been counselled or procured to deal in a security 
on the basis of inside information, deal in a security on the basis of 
inside information, that person will be contravening the new provisions. 
1~ Section 1(7) of the IDA. The prohibition provides that subject to 
section 3 of the IDA, an individual who is for the time being prohibited 
by any provision of section 1 of the IDA from dealing on a recognised stock 
exchange in any securities shall not counsel or procure any other person 
to deal in those securities, knowing or having reasonable cause to believe 
that that person would deal in them on a recognised stock exchange. 
1~ Section 1(8) of the IDA. The prohibition provides that subject to 
section 3 of the IDA, an individual who is prohibited from dealing on a 
recognised stock exchange in any securities by reason of his having any 
information, may not communicate that information to any other person 
(including a body corporate) if he knows or has reasonable cause to believe 
that some or other person will make use of the information for the purpose 
of dealing or of counselling or procuring another person to deal in those 
securities on a recognised stock exchange. 
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does not use intermediaries. Indirect dealing would take place 
where the person uses intermediaries. Thus indirect dealing 
would probably take place where the securities are held by a 
company which the person controls, or where the securities are 
held by a trust, and the person is a trustee and has a vested 
interest in the income or the assets of the trust. Since the 
new provisions do not require that the person dealing in the 
security must derive a benefit therefrom, indirect dealing may 
also include the situation where the person deals in securities 
on the behalf of another party, where it is only the other 
party who derives any benefit from the dealing. 
In addition, it is submitted that the words "directly or 
indirectly" qualify the words "knowingly deals in a security 
on the basis of unpublished price-sensitive information in 
respect of that security". For example, what happens where a 
person is simply given a hint or recommendation to buy a 
particular security under circumstances where the actual 
unpublished price-sensitive information is not communicated to 
him? If the person deals in the security on the basis of the 
recommendation he would not be dealing in the security directly 
on the basis of the inside information. However, it is arguable 
that the person is dealing indirectly on the basis of inside 
information in that the person is dealing on "the strength of 
the information forming the basis for the hint or 
recommendation. " 127 
S.3.2.3 on the basis of 
The requirement that the person must deal "on the basis of" the 
unpublished price-sensitive information indicates that there 
must be a causal connection between the dealing in the security 
and the possession of the inside information. Thus the mere 
dealing in a security while in the possession of unpublished 
127 Jooste op cit note 20 at 597. 
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price-sensitive information in respect of that security does 
not constitute insider trading if the dealing is not done on 
the basis of the unpublished price-sensitive information. 128 
Thus a stock broker who happens to be in possession of 
unpublished price-sensitive information in respect of a 
security and who is requested to deal in that security by a 
client would not be dealing in that security on the basis of 
the unpublished price-sensitive information but rather on the 
basis of the instruction he received from his client. 129 
5.3.2.4 Any person 
The use of the words "any person" indicates that section 
440F(l) includes within its ambit both natural persons and 
legal entities such as companies, close corporations and 
trusts. 130 Section 440F(l) is not limited in its application 
to certain categories of persons who, as a result of their 
positions, are likely to acquire access to unpublished price-
sensitive information. Section 440F{l) is applicable to all 
persons. 131 
However, section 440F(6) enables the Minister, 132 on the advice 
of the panel, by notice in the Gazette, to exempt any class of 
1~ The accused, where it is proved at trial that he was in possession 
of unpublished price-sensitive information in respect of the security at 
the time of the alleged dealing, will be obliged to rebut the presumption 
created by section 440F ( 3) (a) read with section 440F ( 3) ( i) in terms of 
which he is presumed to have knowingly dealt in the security on the basis 
of the unpublished price-sensitive information. 
1~ Van Zyl op cit note 101 at 264. 
1~ Section 2 of the Interpretation Act 33 of 1957. 
131 Whilst the repealed section 233 of the Companies Act imposed 
liability on insiders as defined in section 229 of the Companies Act, the 
new provisions "impose liability on persons generally": Luiz op cit note 
9 at 330. Examples of persons who potentially fall within the ambit and 
scope of the new provisions are directors, employees, shareholders, market 
professionals, researchers, analysts and government officials. 
132 Minister of Industries, Commerce and Tourism. 
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persons from the provisions of section 440F on such conditions 
and to such an extent as he deems fit, and at any time in like 
manner to revoke or amend such exemption. 
The purpose of section 440F(6) is to enable the Minister to 
grant an exemption in the event that the new provisions are too 
wide and include activities within their ambit that were not 
intended to be included. 133 Section 440F(6) is a product of the 
uncertainties and difficulties in regulating insider 
trading. 134 The scope of the exemption is wide and thus the 
possible forms which the exemption may take, are numerous. 135 
S.3.2.S Security 
A security is defined in section 440A(l) of the Companies Act 
and 
"means any shares in the capital of a company and 
includes stock and debentures convertible into 
shares and any rights or interests in a c"ompany or 
in respect of any such shares, stock or debentures, 
and includes any 'financial instrument' as defined 
in the Financial Markets Control Act, 1989 (Act No. 
55 of 1989)". 
I ; The definition of "security" is thus extremely wide and 
includes futures and option contracts. 136 The inclusion of 
derivative instruments such as futures and option contracts in 
the definition is necessary since the dealing in derivative 
instruments on the basis of inside information is, in 
principle, no less unfair than the dealing in shares on the 
133 Botha op cit note 2 at 15. 
134 Ibid. 
135 Ibid. 
1~ Section 233 referred only to shares and debentures, although it 
appears that "dealing" in section 233 included the procuring or exercising 
an option to purchase shares or the sale of such an option: Henochsberg op 
cit note 38 at 371. 
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basis of inside information. 137 However, since paragraph ( i) 
of the definition of unpublished price-sensitive information 
in section 440F(2) (a) only refers to information in respect of 
a company, insider trading in derivatives such as index 
derivatives, commodity derivatives and loan stock derivatives 
are excluded from the prohibition in section 440F ( 1) . 138 It 
is suggested that the prohibition on insider trading should be 
extended to all kinds of derivatives since the trading in such 
derivatives is no less unfair than the dealing in other 
securities . 139 
5.3.2.6 Unpublished price-sensitive information 
It will be a question of fact in each case whether or not the 
information in question satisfies the criteria specified in the 
definition of unpublished price-sensitive information contained 
in section 440F(2) 140 • The definition contains the following 
elements: 
(i) the nature of the information; 
(ii) the availability of the information; and 
(iii) the price-sensitivity of the information. 
137 See Goodman "Trading in Commodity Futures Using Nonpublic 
Information" 1986 Sec LR 273 at 280. Van Zyl op cit note 101 at 249. 
138 Van Zyl "Insider Trading: Law and Ethics", seminar presented by the 
Research Unit for Banking Law of the Rand Afrikaans University, 25 June 
1993 at 4. 
139 Ibid. 
1~ In terms of section 440F(2)(a) unpublished price-sensitive 
information means information which -
" ( i) 
(ii) 
(iii) 
relates to matters in respect of the internal affairs of a 
company or its operations, assets, earning power or involvement 
as of feror or of feree company in an affected transaction or 
proposed affected transaction; 
is not generally available to the reasonable investor in the 
relevant markets for that security; and 
would reasonably be expected to affect materially the price of 
such security if it were generally available." 
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S.3.2.6.1 The Nature of the Information 
The information must be information that 
"relates to matters in respect of the internal 
affairs of a company or its operations, assets, 
earning power or involvement as offeror or offeree 
company in an affected transaction or proposed 
affected transaction11141 • 
The phrases "relates to matters" and "in respect of" prima 
facie extend the ambit and scope of the matters referred to in 
section 440F(2) (a) (i). The aforesaid phrases are, however, 
ambiguous in that they have an elastic quality in terms of 
which they can be interpreted as requiring a direct 
relationship or an indirect or remote relationship to the 
matters referred to in section 440F(2)(a)(i). 142 Thus the 
scope of this element is uncertain and is dependent on whether 
the courts interpret the aforesaid phrases widely or 
I
I narrowly. 143 
No distinction is drawn between specific and general 
information . 144 Specific information is clearly included but 
141 Section 440F ( 2) (a) ( i) of the Companies Act. 
142 See Commissioner for Inland Revenue v Butcher Bros (Pty) Ltd 1945 
AD 301 at 320 where it was held that: "The expression 'in respect of' is 
one which indicates a relationship which may be a direct or causal 
relationship • • • but I do not think that it necessarily or invariably 
indicates such a relationship". See also Ex parte M. Braude & Co 1936 CPD 
480 at 482-483 where the expression "relating to" was held to indicate a 
very loose or indirect relationship. 
143 The correct approach to the interpretation of the expression "in 
respect of" was set out in Rabinowitz and another v De Beers Consolidated 
Mines Ltd and another 1958 (3) SA 619 (A) at 631 as follows: "But 
expressions like 'in respect of' and 'in connection with', though they may 
sometimes be used to cover a wide range of association, must in other cases 
be limited to the closer or more direct forms of association indicated by 
the context." 
144 The distinction between general and specific information lies in the 
distinction between day-to-day knowledge and knowledge of important factors 
which, when revealed to the market, will move the price of shares: Hannigan 
op cit note 5 at 52. 
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it is uncertain whether the definition includes general 
information. This should be contrasted with the position in the 
United Kingdom where the definition of unpublished price-
sensitive information distinguishes between information of a 
general nature and information of a specific nature, and 
excludes information of a general nature.u5 
Corporate inf ormation146 is included within the scope of the 
definition. The question arises whether market information147 
is also included. An example of market information would be 
/Prior knowledge that a respected firm of stock brokers is about 
V to release a favourable report about a company. 148 A trader 
could trade as profitably on such information as he could on 
prior knowledge that a company is about to release better-than-
expected financial results. 149 In the event that the phrases 
"relates to matters" and "in respect of" are interpreted 
broadly, it is arguable that market information is included 
within the ambit of the definition of unpublished price-
sensitive information. 
The particular reference to information that relates to a 
company's involvement in an affected transaction or proposed 
affected transaction is not surprising since most insider 
145 The IDA does not provide a test for distinguishing between general 
and specific information. Section lO(a) of the IDA refers to information 
that "relates to specific matters relating or of concern (directly or 
indirectly) to that company, that is to say, is not of a general nature 
relating or of concern to that company". 
146 Suter op cit note 6 at 31 defines corporate information as 
information that "emanates from within the company and directly relates to 
expected earnings and assets". 
147 Branson "American Business Law Insider Trading - II The British 
Regulation in the Light of the American Experience" 1982 J Bus L 413 at 414 
defines market information as "information about the market for a company's 
shares rather than about the company itself." 
148 Ibid. 
149 Ibid. 
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dealing transactions take place in relation to take-overs. 150 
The definition of affected transaction151 makes it clear that 
transactions affecting the control of a company fall within the 
scope of the new provisions. 152 This is a substantial 
improvement on section 233 which did not prevent an insider in 
terms of section 233 from dealing in the shares of a target 
company even where he had knowledge of an intended take-over 
of the target company by his own company. 153 The prohibition 
in section 233 applied only to the dealing in the shares and 
debentures of the insider's own company. 
1~ Jooste op cit note 20 at 595. 
151 An "affected transaction" has been defined in section 440A ( 1) of the 
Companies Act as meaning: "any transaction (including a transaction which 
forms part of a series of transactions) or scheme, whatever form it may 
take, which -
(a) taking into account any securities held before such transaction 
or scheme, has or will have the effect of -
(i) vesting control of any company (excluding a close 
corporation) in any person, or two or more persons 
acting in concert, in whom control did not vest prior to 
such transaction or scheme; or 
(ii) any person, or two or more persons acting in concert, 
acquiring, or becoming the sole holder or holders of, 
all the securities, or all the securities of a 
particular class, of any company (excluding a close 
corporation); or 
(b) involves the acquisition by any person, or two or more persons 
acting in concert, in whom control of any company (excluding 
a close corporation) vests on or after the date of commencement 
of section l(c) of the Companies Second Amendment Act, 1990, 
of further securities of that company in excess of the limits 
prescribed in the rules." 
The definition of "affected transaction" was amended by section 1 ( c) of the 
Companies Amendment Act 69 of 1990 and was put into operation with effect 
from 1 February 1991 in terms of Government Notice Rll in Government 
Gazette 12997 of 1 February 1991 (Reg. Gaz. 4646). 
152 Jooste op cit note 20 at 595. 
153 van Zyl op cit note 1 at 79. 
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S.3.2.6.2 The Availability of the Information 
The price-sensitive information is unpublished where it "is not 
generally available to the reasonable investor in the relevant 
markets for that security" . 154 
The determination of who constitutes "the reasonable investor 
in the markets for that security" is likely to be problematic 
and cause uncertainty. 155 Investors do not all have the same 
objectives. An investor who has invested in a security in order 
to obtain a long term capital gain is not likely to monitor the 
information regarding that security as closely as the investor 
who wishes to deal in the security in order to make profits 
over the short term. Thus the information is not likely to 
become generally available to both types of investors at the 
same time. Which investor is the reasonable investor for the 
purposes of section 440F? 
Would the courts, in determining who the reasonable investor 
is, limit themselves to market professionals, or would they 
include the wider investing public? In the case of the former, 
market professionals would be advantaged, since as soon as they 
as a group know of the information, they would be able to 
invest even if the general public do not know of the 
information. 156 The word "investor" strongly indicates that 
members of the investing public must be included. 
The difficulties in determining the reasonable investor from 
a group comprising market professionals and the investing 
1~ Section 440F(2)(a)(ii) of the Companies Act. 
155 By comparison, section 10 (b) of the IDA refers to information "not 
generally known to those persons who are accustomed or would be likely to 
deal in those securities but which would if it were generally known to them 
be likely materially to affect the price of those securities." 
156 Hannigan op cit note 5 at 56. 
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public are apparent . 157 Market professionals and the investing 
public have very different levels of knowledge, expertise, 
understanding of, and involvement with securities and financial 
markets. In addition, in South Africa, the education standards 
of the individuals comprising the general investing public 
varies considerably. 
"Generally available11158 is defined in section 440F(2) (b) to 
mean available in the sense that such steps have been taken, 
and such time has elapsed, that it can reasonably159 be 
expected that the unpublished price-sensitive information is 
or should be known to the reasonable investor in the relevant 
markets for that security. This definition affords the courts 
a measure of discretion to determine on the facts and 
circumstances of each case whether or not there has been an 
adequate dissemination160 of the information. 161 It does not 
however, give any guidance regarding the steps to be taken162 
or the time period that must first lapse and is thus likely to 
157 See R v Nkomo 1964 ( 3) SA 128 (SR) at 131-132 where Beadle CJ 
discussed the difficulties of determining the reasonable man. 
158 In the United States, "generally available" has been held to mean 
that the information must be in a form which is readily translatable into 
investment action: SEC v Texas Gulf Sulphur Co op cit note 101 at 854. See 
Van Zyl op cit note 101 at 252. 
159 The word "reasonably" indicates that the courts will probably apply 
an objective standard in determining whether the information is generally 
available to the reasonable investor. 
iro In the United States, an effective period for the dissemination of 
the information is required: Branson op cit note 147 at 413. See SEC v 
Texas Gulf Sulphur Co op cit note 101 at 853-854. 
161 Van Zyl op cit note 101 at 251. The real time necessary for 
information to become generally available will depend on the exposure given 
the information and the analysis it generates: Wallace op cit note 100 at 
249. Small and relatively unknown firms are at a disadvantage in making the 
information generally available, since large and prestigious firms will be 
able to command more media attention. It follows that insiders in the 
smaller firms will be obliged to wait a longer period before they can trade 
in their securities: Branson op cit note 147 at 414. 
162 Theoretically, publication in any recognised medium is not required. 
The price-sensitive information could become generally available by means 
of word of mouth or some similar means of communication. 
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cause confusion. Examples of possible sources of confusion are: 
the size of the circulation of the publication; the nature of 
the publication; whether publication in both official languages 
is necessary; and whether publication in a black language is 
necessary . 163 
The advantage of the definition of "generally available" is its 
flexibility. The disadvantage is its uncertainty. This 
uncertainty is likely to cause a prudent investor to cease 
trading in the security until he is sure the information is 
"generally available". Prudent investors may thus wait longer 
than is necessary before trading in the security. 
It is nevertheless felt that this disadvantage is preferable 
to the disadvantages inherent in the inflexible approach that 
was contained in section 233. Section 233 lifted the ban on 
insider trading once the information had been publically 
announced on a stock exchange or in a newspaper or through the 
medium of the radio or television. There was thus certainty 
regarding when a person could trade but the inflexibility meant 
that: 
"A public announcement could have been made in 
circumstances which still might not have made the 
information in fact generally available to the 
public (the timing of the announcement may have had 
an important bearing on making the information 
generally available), but which would nevertheless 
have left the insider free to deal, or at least be 
amongst the first to deal. 11 164 
5.3.2.6.3 Price sensitivity 
The unpublished information is price-sensitive if it "would165 
tfil Jooste op cit note 20 at 594. 
tM Luiz op cit note 9 at 331. 
165 
"Would" indicates a higher degree of probability than the use of the 
word "might" would have indicated: Gerstle v Gamble-Skogma Inc 478 F 2d 
1281 at 1302 (2d Cir 1973). See Van Zyl op cit note 101 at 253. 
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reasonably be expected to affect materially166 the price of 
such security if it were generally available."M7 
It is clearly not necessary that the information actually 
affects the price of the securities. It must simply reasonably 
/be expected to do so168 , presumably in the eyes of the 
reasonable investor. The use of the word "reasonably" indicates 
an objective standard. 169 The consequence of an objective 
standard is to prevent an insider from escaping liability on 
the basis of his own subjective belief as to the likely effect 
of information on the price of securities. 
The difficulties involved in determining whether the 
information was available to the reasonable investor may be 
resolved to an extent by this element of the definition of 
unpublished price-sensitive information. 170 If the information 
did have a material impact on the price of the securities, then 
it follows that it was not generally available to the 
reasonable investor . 171 This element also indicates that it 
was not the intention of the legislature to include general 
information within the ambit and scope of the definition. 172 
This is because it indicates that the legislature was concerned 
with information that would have a noticeable impact on the 
price of the securities rather than information falling within 
the day-to-day knowledge of directors, employees or market 
166 
"Materially" connotes a change that is considerable or important. 
For a discussion on the meaning of the word "material" see Oat;orian 
Propert;ies (Pt;y) Lt;d v Maroun 1973 (3) SA 779 (A) at 785 and Arendse v 
Badroodien 1971 (2) SA 16 (C) at 18• 
167 Section 440F ( 2) (a) (iii) of the Companies Act. 
1~ See Gore-Browne op cit note 1 at 12.027-12.028. 
i@ Jooste op cit note 20 at 595. 
1~ See Hannigan op cit note 5 at 56. 
171 Idem at 57. 
172 Ibid. 
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professionals. 173 Thus in practice, this element of the 
definition of unpublished price-sensitive information may be 
the decisive element. 174 
Section 10 (b) of the IDA refers to information " likely 
materially to affect the price ... ". There is uncertainty 
whether this phrase connotes a test that is subjective or 
objective. 175 In the United States the materiality test is 
formulated in different ways, but its purpose is usually to 
facilitate a distinction between significant matters and those 
which are not important enough to affect substantially an 
investment decision. 176 The test is an objective one in regard 
to open market transactions. 177 With direct personal 
transactions, whilst the test is essentially objective, an 
element of subj ecti vi ty has been introduced by taking into 
account the relations between the parties. 178 
5.4 The criminal Offence 
A contravention of section 440F(l) is a criminal offence. The 
use of the word "knowingly" implies that mens rea is an element 
of the offence in the form of dolus rather than culpa . 179 
173 Ibid. 
174 Ibid. 
175 Suter op cit note 6 at 103. 
176 Ibid. 
in Ibid. 
178 Ibid. 
1~ S v Bezuidenhout 1979 (3) SA 1325 (T) at 1327. Milton South African 
Criminal Law and Procedure III: Statutory Offences (1988) by Milton and 
Cowling chap 2 at 10. 
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In South African law, in regard to statutory offences, legal 
intention1w will suffice unless the statute expressly requires 
intent of a particular kind. 181 It is suggested that section 
440F does not require intention of a particular kind, and 
accordingly that legal intention will suffice. 
Where dolus is the mens rea of a statutory offence, dolus must 
relate to all the elements of the offence and, as such "imports 
as an element of liability, proof of knowledge of 
unlawfulness. 11182 Thus the state must prove that the accused 
acted with knowledge of the unlawfulness of his act. 183 In 
other words, that the accused was aware that he was 
contravening the law. 184 
To rebut the presumption created by section 440F(3) (a) read 
with section 440F(3) (i) of the necessary criminal intention, 
the accused will have to prove on a balance of probabilities 
that he did not know that his conduct was unlawful. 185 The 
accused would lack knowledge of unlawfulness where he acts 
1~ Intention can be divided into two types, namely actual and legal 
intention. Actual intention exists where it was the accused's aim to do the 
unlawful act, or where, although not the accused's aim and object, he 
foresaw the unlawful act as certain (dolus directus or indirectus). Legal 
intention exists where the accused does not mean the unlawful act but he 
foresees it as a possible result of his act (dolus eventualis): Burchell 
and Hunt South African Criminal Law and Procedure Volume I General 
Principles (1983) at 136-137. 
181 Idem at 220-221. 
182 Milton op cit note 179 at 18. 
183 s v Magidson 1984 (3) SA 825 (T) at 830: Ackerman J stated "Dolus, 
however, also requires knowledge of the unlawfulness of the act •••• Such 
actual knowledge, however, may also be by way of dolus eventualis. It is 
also not necessary that the accused must be aware that he is contravening 
a specific section of a specific Act. It is sufficient if he knows that 
what he is doing is unlawful. Nor does the accused have to be certain that 
what he is doing is unlawful. It is sufficient if he realises that what he 
is doing may possibly be unlawful and reconciles himself with this 
possibility." 
tM Milton op cit note 179 at 18. 
185 Van Dorsten op cit note 121 at 179-180. See also s v Ngwenya 1979 
(2) SA 96 (A) at 101-102. 
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under bona fide ignorance of the law. 186 Such ignorance may 
exist where the accused is unaware of the existence of section 
440F or because the accused has received incorrect advice as 
to the law. 187 Since the test whether the accused has the 
necessary criminal intention is subjective188 , the 
reasonableness of the accused's error of law or fact is 
irrelevant. 189 The concept of reasonableness or unreason-
ableness, and the degree thereof in the circumstances of each 
case, only becomes relevant in connection with the proof of 
whether the accused acted bona fide or not, that is, whether 
or not the accused was genuinely mistaken. 190 Since the 
accused must prove that he believed his conduct was not 
unlawful, the unreasonableness of the accused's belief could 
affect his credibility and thereby make it more difficult for 
the accused to discharge the onus. 19i 
In a multifunctional company with a separate legal personality 
any unpublished price-sensitive information regarding a 
security in the possession of one division would mean that the 
company itself has knowledge thereof. 192 Thus should another 
division of that company deal in that security the company 
would knowingly have dealt in that security while in possession 
of unpublished price-sensitive information regarding that 
security. 
186 Milton op cit note 179 at 19. A defence of ignorance of the law will 
succeed if it appears from the evidence as a whole that there is a 
reasonable possibility that the accused did not know that his act was 
unlawful: S v De Blom 1977 (3) SA 513 (A) at 532. 
187 Milton op cit note 179 at 19. 
1~ R v Mkhize 1951 (3) SA 28 (A) at 33. 
189 Van Dorsten op cit note 121 at 180. See also S v Sam 1980 (4) SA 289 
(T) at 294. 
1~ s v Sam op cit note 189 at 294. 
191 Van Dorsten op cit note 121 at 180. 
1~ Jooste op cit note 20 at 597. 
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However, as Jooste193 points out, in addition to such knowledge 
it must also be proved that the dealing was "on the basis" of 
the inside information before it can be held that the 
multifunctional company contravened the provisions of section 
440F{l). In the light of the aforesaid presumption of the 
necessary criminal intention, it will be difficult for the 
multifunctional company to avoid liability . 194 The 
multifunctional company would be obliged to establish that it 
did not deal on the basis of the unpublished price-sensitive 
information but rather, for example, on the basis of an 
instruction from a client. It would assist the multifunctional 
company in rebutting the presumption to lead evidence that it 
had constructed a Chinese Wall and accordingly that the 
unpublished price-sensitive information did not flow to the 
division dealing in the security. 195 
5.4.1 The criminal sanction 
Section 441(1) (a) provides that the penalty for contravening 
section 440F{l) shall be "a fine not exceeding R500 000,00 or 
imprisonment for a period not exceeding 10 years or to both 
such fine and such imprisonment." 
Since there is, as yet, no data in South Africa on the 
conviction of insider traders, it will be difficult to 
ascertain the deterrent effect of the penalty. The rewards to 
193 Idem at 598. 
194 Ibid. 
195 Section 11 of the Securities Amendments Act of 1988 of New Zealand 
extends to organisations a defence to insider trading, where the 
organisation has developed a reasonably designed structure that assures 
that the trading division at the time of trading did not have in its 
possession inside information, which was within the knowledge of another 
employee of the organisation. See Cox "An Economic Perspective of Insider 
Trading Regulation and Enforcement in New Zealand" (1990) 4 Can~erbury LR 
268 at 281-282. 
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be gained from insider trading will clearly affect the efficacy 
of the penalty . 196 
It seems possible that the rewards from insider trading can be 
so high that the penalty is not an effective deterrent. 197 
Thus it is suggested that a penalty be flexible and related to 
any gains made from insider 
penalty of three times the 
trading . 198 In the U. s. A. a 
illegal profits made can be 
imposed. 1~ In the United Kingdom, no limit is placed on the 
amount of the fine that can be imposed. 200 
s.s The Statutory Civil Remedy 
The purpose of a civil remedy is to compensate the outsider for 
the loss suffered by the outsider, and simultaneously act as 
a deterrent against insider trading by depriving the insider 
of his gains. 201 
Section 440F(4) (a) creates a statutory civil remedy by 
providing that any person who contravenes section 4 4 OF ( 1) shal 1 
be liable to any other person for any loss or damage suffered 
by that person as a result of such contravention. Section 
440F(4) (b) provides that in dealings in a security on a stock 
exchange or a financial market as defined in section 1 of the 
I% The probability of detection and the severity of punishment play a 
major role in reducing the incidence of the crime of insider trading: see 
Botha "The Economics of the Crime and Punishment of Insider Trading in 
South Africa" (1992) 4 SA Mere LJ 145 at 148-156. 
197 Botha "Increased Maximum Fine for Insider Trading: A Realistic and 
Effective Deterrent?" (1990) 107 SALJ 504 at 504-508. 
1~ Jooste op cit note 20 at 599. 
iw Section 2l(d)(2)(A) of the Securities Exchange Act 15 U.S. (78/qq) 
(1984). See also Jooste op cit note 20 at 599. 
200 Section 8(l)(a) of the IDA. 
~1 The motive for insider trading is to make profits. Thus, if the 
profit incentive is removed, the incidence of insider trading should 
decrease. 
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Financial Markets Control Act 55 of 1989, that the plaintiff 
need not prove intention or negligence towards the plaintiff 
in an action contemplated in section 440F{4) (a). It is 
suggested that the rationale behind this exclusion arises from 
the anonymity that characterises stock exchange transactions 
which would render proof of negligence or intention practically 
impossible. 2m Intention or negligence must be proven in cases 
where the dealing does not take place on the markets ref erred 
to in section 440F ( 4) (b) . Since the conclusion of these 
transactions will normally be preceded by face-to-face 
negotiations, the proof of intention or negligence should not 
be too difficult for the plaintiff. 
The use of the words "any person who contravenes subsection 1" 
in section 440F{4)(a) means that a plaintiff who wishes to 
avail himself of the statutory remedy is required to prove that 
the defendant contravened section 440F{l). The plaintiff must 
prove all the elements of the offence. Since the action brought 
by the plaintiff is a civil action, the plaintiff will be 
obliged to prove such contravention on a balance of 
probabilities. 203 In addition, the use of the word 
"contravenes" in section 440F ( 4) (a) as opposed to the words "is 
convicted of contravening" suggests that it is not necessary 
that the person be convicted of contravening section 
440F ( 1) . 204 
The words "as a result of such contravention" in section 
440F{4) (a) indicate that the plaintiff must prove that his loss 
or damage205 occurred as a result of the contravention of 
section 440F{l). There must be a causal connection between the 
202 Luiz op cit note 9 at 331. 
~3 Jooste op cit note 20 at 603. 
204 Ibid. 
~5 The plaintiff's loss or damage would probably be the difference 
between the price that the plaintiff traded at, and what the transaction 
price would have been if the inside information had been generally known: 
Jooste op cit note 20 at 603. 
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loss or damage and the contravention of section 440F ( 1). 206 
Thus the plaintiff's loss or damage must be caused by the 
defendant's knowingly dealing in the security on the basis of 
unpublished price-sensitive information. 2ITT The question 
arises whether the plaintiff's loss is in fact caused by the 
defendant's dealing in the security on the basis of unpublished 
price-sensitive information? Jooste suggests that in most cases 
it would not be, since most insider trading transgressions 
involve stock exchange transactions where the aggrieved party 
would have bought or sold the shares at the same price 
irrespective of whether there had been insider trading or 
not. 208 Thus one cannot say that the aggrieved party suffered 
the loss as a result of the insider trading. 2~ 
In addition, the plaintiff, in order to succeed with the 
statutory civil remedy must establish the identity of the 
defendant and that the defendant caused the plaintiff's 
loss. 210 Given the anonymity that characterises stock exchange 
transactions, this will, in most cases, be practically 
impossible. 211 The American answer to this problem has been to 
do away with the privity requirement. 212 It is thus not 
necessary to show that the defendant bought from or sold to the 
plaintiff. The only proof needed is that the defendant traded 
106 Ibid. 
7IJ7 Ibid. 
208 Ibid. 
209 Ibid. 
210 Idem at 604-605. 
211 It appears that the statutory civil remedy will be entirely 
ineffective with regard to stock exchange transactions and that the 
deterrent value of the statutory civil remedy will be limited. 
212 Fischman v Raytheon Mfg. Co. 188 F 2d 783 at 786-789 (2d Cir 1951) 
is regarded as the first case articulating a departure from the common law 
privity requirements. See Branson "American Business Law Insider Trading -
III The British Regulation in the Light of the American Experience" 1982 
J Bus L 536 at 536. 
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in the same time period that the plaintiff traded. 213 In 
certain instances this resulted in a multiplicity of actions 
being brought against a defendant with the result that the 
defendant became liable to pay out to plaintiffs a far greater 
sum than the profits made or loss avoided by the defendant. 214 
Clearly this result is undesirable. The U. s. courts have 
remedied this problem by limiting the liability of the 
defendant to the profit made or the loss avoided by the 
defendant. 215 Relaxation of the pri vi ty requirement 
nevertheless creates the fortuitous plaintiff - whether or not 
the defendant traded, the plaintiff would have bought or sold 
the shares. 216 On recovery, the plaintiff makes a windfall 
gain. 2n The fortuitous plaintiff is morally acceptable if the 
objective of the legislation is deterrence and punishment 
rather than compensation. 218 
It is further submitted that in general a private civil remedy 
is neither an effective deterrent nor an effective means of 
enabling victims to claim compensation. 219 It is suggested that 
this is due in part to the following reasons: 
(1) The determination of the identity of the insider may 
entail the need to have access to the records of the 
insider's broker which could be time-consuming and hence 
213 Branson op cit note 212 at 536. 
214 Idem at 537. 
215 Ibid. Elkind v Liggett and Meyers Inc. 635 F 2d 156 at 168-173 (2d 
Cir 1980). 
216 Branson op cit note 212 at 539. 
217 Ibid. 
218 Ibid. 
219 Private litigation has not been an effective deterrent in the USA: 
Cox op cit note 195 at 275. 
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costly. 220 Since the search may be fruitless, an 
outsider may be hesitant to even commence the search. 221 
(2) The action is likely to be expensive222 and the risk of 
~ failure is not insignificant. This is likely to deter the 
outsider from instituting action. 
(3) The insider will only have to pay to the outsider the 
loss or damage the outsider has suffered. This means that 
an insider will only have to disgorge the profits he made 
or make a payment equivalent to the loss he avoided. Thus 
from a civil remedy perspective it is worth the risk for 
the insider to trade. If he is not sued, he makes a 
profit, or avoids a loss, and if he is sued, he is in no 
worse position than he would have been if he had not 
traded. 223 
It is thus proposed that the panel be empowered, in the public 
interest, to institute a civil action against insiders. 2M The 
panel's cause of action would be against any person who 
contravened the provisions of section 440F(l) and would simply 
require proof that the defendant contravened the provisions of 
_/"/ section 440F(l). It is suggested that the panel be entitled to 
recover punitive damages of up to three times the profit made 
or the loss that was avoided. The damages would be utilised to 
pay for the costs of the investigation, to contribute towards 
the general costs of the surveillance of the securities market 
220 See Gillen "Sanctions against Insider Trading: A Proposal for 
Reform" (1991) 70 Can Bar R 215 at 233. 
221 Ibid. 
222 Even if the outsider succeeds in his action, generally he will not 
recover full legal costs. 
223 Cox op cit note 195 at 279-280. 
224 This proposal is based on Gillen' s proposals for the Canadian 
insider trading provisions: See Gillen op cit note 220 at 240-242. 
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for the purposes of the detection of insider trading, and to 
compensate the outsider who traded with the insider. 225 
Such an action is more likely to be instituted than a private 
civil action since the panel in most instances will have more 
resources than a private litigant. The panel, due to its powers 
in terms of section 4400, will be able to conduct the necessary 
investigations to obtain the information needed to bring a 
successful civil action. 226 The lower standard of proof 
required in civil actions means that it is easier to succeed 
in such an action as opposed to a criminal action. The 
provision for punitive damages means that the incentive to 
bring the action is higher than under the present statutory 
civil remedy where only normal damages can be recovered. 227 In 
addition, by enabling the outsider to be compensated from these 
damages the need for the outsider to bring his own action is 
obviated. In this way, a potentially wasteful secondary action 
by the outsider can be avoided. Further, the social stigma 
attached to an action brought by the panel is likely to be 
greater than that attached to a private action. 
Is a contract in contravention of section 440F void? In Metro 
Western Cape (Pty) Ltd v Ross228 , the court stated that: 
"As a general rule a contract impliedly prohibited 
by statute is void and unenforceable but this rule 
is not inflexible or inexorable. Although a contract 
is in violation of a statute it will not be declared 
void unless such was the intention of the 
Legislature and this is nonetheless the rule in the 
case of a contract in violation of a statute which 
imposes a criminal sanction. The legislative intent 
not to render void a contract may be inf erred from 
225 Idem at 240. 
226 Idem at 241. 
227 Ibid. 
228 1986 (3) SA 181 (A) at 188. See also Standard Bank v Estate Van Rhyn 
1925 AD 266 at 274-275; Luke and Co. v Pretorius 1938 TPD 463 at 467-468; 
and Eland Boerdery (Edms) Bpk v Anderson 1966 (4) SA 400 (T) at 405. 
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the general rules of interpretation. Each case must 
be dealt with in the light of its own language, 
scope and object and the consequences in relation to 
justice and convenience of adopting one view rather 
than the other." 
It is suggested that, in the light of the scope and objectn9 
of section 440F and from a perspective of convenience and 
justice230 , it is preferable to adopt the view that 
transactions in contravention of section 440F are not void.n1 
Is a contract in contravention of section 440F voidable at the 
option of the outsider? It is submitted that a contract is 
voidable if the underlying consensus has been obtained in an 
improper manner. 232 The underlying consensus would be obtained 
in an improper manner where the one party "acted in a manner 
which according to the generally recognised norms of conduct 
is not acceptable and reasonable. 11 n3 To trade on the basis of 
inside information is unlawful and accordingly, it is 
submitted, the underlying consensus would have been obtained 
in a manner which is not acceptable and reasonable. 
Accordingly, it is my opinion that a contract in contravention 
of section 440F is voidable at the option of the outsider. 2~ 
229 It is suggested that the scope and object of section 440F is to 
prevent insider trading, punish insiders by means of a criminal sanction 
and provide redress to outsiders by means of a statutory civil action and 
not to render void any insider dealing transaction: see Jooste op cit note 
20 at 605-606. 
230 It is submitted that, given the impersonal nature of stock exchange 
transactions and the difficulty in identifying the parties to a particular 
transaction, to hold transactions in contravention of section 440F void, 
would result in such transactions being void without the parties thereto 
being aware of it. In addition, where the transaction has been completed, 
restitution would be problematic: see Jooste op cit note 20 at 606. 
231 Ibid. 
232 Van der Merwe and Van Huyssteen "Improperly Obtained Consensus" 
(1987) 50 THRHR 78 at 78-82. See also Plaaslike Boeredienste (Edms) Bpk v 
Chemfos 1986 (1) SA 819 (A) at 848. 
233 Van der Merwe and Van Huyssteen op cit note 232 at 79. 
234 See Jooste op cit note 20 at 606. 
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CONCLUSION 
It is apparent from the aforementioned that the common law and 
the now repealed section 233 of the Companies Act were 
inadequate for the purposes of preventing the trading on the 
basis of inside information from taking place or in providing 
an adequate remedy to outsiders. 
In order to remedy these inadequacies and to promote investor 
confidence in the integrity of the securities markets, the 
legislature introduced the new provisions. 
Whilst the new provisions are a substantial improvement on 
section 233, certain aspects of the new provisions need to be 
reconsidered. Its scope should be widened to include trading 
on the basis of inside information in all kinds of derivative 
instruments. Further, the statutory civil remedy will not be 
of assistance to most victims of insider trading and 
accordingly needs to be reformulated. It may well be that the 
only feasible solution to the difficulties of drafting an 
effective civil remedy in respect of stock exchange 
transactions, is to do away with the privity requirement. Since 
private litigation is not an effective deterrent to trading on 
the basis of inside information, or an effective means of 
compensating outsiders, consideration should be given to the 
empowerment of the panel, in the public interest, to institute 
a civil action against insiders and in terms thereof recover 
punitive damages from the insider of up to three times the 
profit made or the loss that was avoided. The damages so 
recovered can be used for the costs of the enforcement of the 
new provisions and to compensate those persons who have 
·suffered losses due to others trading on the basis of inside 
information. 
The presumptions created in terms of section 440F(3) of the new 
provisions are likely to assist the state in successfully 
53 
prosecuting persons trading on the basis of inside information 
in terms of section 440F. However, in the light of the 
substantial prof its that can be made from trading on the basis 
/of inside information, the criminal penalty appears to be 
"·/ insufficient and thus an ineffective deterrent. The quantum of 
the fine should bear a relationship to the profit made or the 
loss avoided. 
Substantial reliance has been placed on the panel to monitor 
and investigate alleged trading on the basis of inside 
information. Should the panel fail in its task of monitoring 
and investigating alleged insider trading activities, the new 
provisions will be of little use in regulating insider trading. 
If insider trading laws are to be obeyed they must be enforced. 
~t is thus imperative that the panel be adequately financed so 
J"that it can fulfil its substantial role in regulating the 
trading on the basis of inside information in South Africa. 
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